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Commissioner Mario Monti’s impact on Article 82 of the EC Treaty dur-ing his period as EC Competition Commissioner has not been as revolu-
tionary as his impact on other areas of EC competition law. Nonetheless, the
European Commission has done serious work on Article 82 cases, notably tak-
ing several important decisions: Microsoft in the area of refusal to supply and
tying and Michelin II on rebates. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the
Court of First Instance (CFI) have also made important contributions to the
law on Article 82 with their judgments in IMS Health and in appeals from
these rebates cases. On a legislative front, Commissioner Monti has brought
the Commission’s modernization program through to adoption of a new
enforcement system in May 2004, with significant re-emphasis of Commission
activity on cases with market power, interesting initiatives to allow dominant
companies to benefit from Article 81(3) and a general review of Article 82
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I. Introduction
When thinking of the term of office of Commissioner Mario Monti, who succeed-
ed Karel Van Miert as EC Competition Commissioner in November 1999, one
does not immediately think of his impact on Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Article
82). It is true that the European Commission’s decision against Microsoft1 stands
out as an excellent example of strong enforcement—two words that sum up
Commissioner Monti’s term. However, unlike the modernization of the imple-
mentation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Article 81), or the revised EC Merger
Regulation, there has not been any revolutionary change in the application of
Article 82 during Commissioner Monti’s tenure. Nonetheless, there have been
interesting developments, as explained later in this paper, including renewed
focus on cases involving market power. A review of Article 82 has also now start-
ed, which may lead to some modernization in this area of competition policy.
Before outlining developments in Article 82 during Commissioner Monti’s
term, it is worth considering the Article 82 legacy that he inherited. Two features
stand out. First, in perhaps the most important Article 82 case decided by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) during Commissioner Van Miert’s tenure, Oscar
Bronner,2 the ECJ, following the opinion of Advocate General Francis Jacobs,
took a narrow view of the doctrine of essential facilities, rolling back what was
up to then an apparently expansive doctrine. Second, the Commission inherit-
ed an analytical framework in which certain practices were considered abusive in
the hands of the dominant, because of their likely effects. Thus, certain types of
progressive rebates were considered abusive, even though non-dominant compa-
nies could offer them and, to that extent, they appear to be normal competition.
This comes from old ECJ and Court of First Instance (CFI) judgments such as
Hoffmann La Roche3 and Michelin I.4 Such law is controversial, limiting as it does
the ability of dominant firms to compete, other than through clearly proven,
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1 Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft (Mar. 24, 2004, not yet reported) [hereinafter
Microsoft].
2 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791 (holding that a facility
would only be deemed essential where denial of access thereto would be likely to eliminate all com-
petition on the relevant market and where access was indispensable or, at the very least, it would not
be economically viable for a company operating at the same scale as the dominant entity to create a
second such facility).
3 Case 85/76, Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
4 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industries Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461. See
also, Case T-65/89, BPB Industries plc and British Gypsum v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. II-389 and Case
T-228/97, Irish Sugar v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. II-2969. For a recent exposition on the development
of the EC law on rebates offered by dominant firms, see Luc Gyselen, Rebates: Competition on the
Merits or Exclusionary Practice?, available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2003/
200306COMP-Gyselen-sII.pdf. The author was at the time an official at the Commission’s Competition
Directorate-General.
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performance- based efficiencies. Rules like this have been one of the reasons why
there have been recent calls for modernization of Article 82. 
Many of the decisions taken by the Commission over the last five years reflect
this inheritance. The question now is whether, with the announcement of a
review of the application of Article 82, the Commission may see practical ways
to modernize Article 82, consistent with such a background.
This paper begins with two long sections: a consideration of the Microsoft deci-
sion as it pertains to refusal to supply and tying (Section II) and then an analy-
sis of developments on pricing issues (Section III). We then include three short-
er sections, one on the ongoing use of Article 82 in liberalizing industries that
were, until recently, state-controlled (Section IV), another on significant nor-
mative developments over the last five years (Section V), and then a conclusion
setting out some ideas that we believe should guide the Commission when it sets
out to modernize the application of Article 82 (Section VI). It will be shown
that Commissioner Monti’s successor, Neelie Kroes, will start with a rich inher-
itance of issues on which to work.
II. Microsoft
The Commission’s decision against Microsoft, a very detailed text of some 300 pages,
was adopted in April 2004. The case, wherein the Commission imposed a huge fine
of EUR 497.2 million, concerned two distinct abuses: a refusal to supply and tying.
We deal with these issues in turn and, when considering refusal to supply, we will
also discuss the ECJ’s recent judgment in IMS Health,5 since there is an interesting
common theme—when should a dominant company be obliged to license its intel-
lectual property? The Commission also required controversial unbundling and
opening up of secondary markets by obliging Microsoft to reveal interface material
considered key to competition on those markets. Microsoft has already appealed.6
A. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY
The most controversial part of the Microsoft decision relates to the Commission’s
finding that, by refusing to make interoperability information for certain “work
group server operating systems” available, Microsoft had abused its dominant
Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82
5 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health (Apr. 29, 2004, not yet reported) [hereinafter IMS Health].
6 This procedure will take a number of years. Microsoft applied for an interim suspension of the reme-
dies proposed in the Commission’s decision. However, the President of the CFI, in an order issued on
Dec. 22, 2004, refused to grant this suspension. The President found that while Microsoft had estab-
lished a prima facie case as to the illegality of the Commission’s decision, it had not adduced suffi-
cient evidence to show that implementation of the remedies might cause it serious and irreparable
damage.
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position.7 The decision obliges Microsoft to make this information available on
a non-discriminatory basis.
The Commission reasoned that Microsoft had a dominant position on the mar-
ket for PC operating systems, a fact that was not in dispute. The Commission went
further, however, and stated that Microsoft was not only dominant but also “the de
facto standard operating system product for client PCs.”8 Microsoft also had a
growing share of the market for work group server operating systems, and the
Commission considered that the company was already dominant in this market. 
Following the ECJ judgment in Tetra Pak II,9 the Commission highlighted the
close links between the PC operating systems market and the work group server
operating systems market, due to interoperability operating requirements. By
refusing to provide full interoperability information, Microsoft was considered to
be making it difficult for other systems to operate properly with Windows, there-
by restricting competition on the work group server operating systems market.
The Commission found that this was part of a “general pattern of conduct”
designed to create and exploit “a range of privileged connections between
[Microsoft’s] dominant PC operating system and its work group operating sys-
tem.”10 The Commission considered that the refusal to disclose limited technical
development on the market, thereby indirectly harming consumers, and noted
that Microsoft had disclosed interoperability information before it began to
develop its own work group product. 
The Commission’s remedy does not require disclosure of source code, but
Microsoft is obliged to disclose interface documentation. Microsoft is also
required to conclude licenses on fair and reasonable terms to the extent its
patents or other intellectual property (IP) are necessary for use of the interoper-
ability information. It is noteworthy in this respect that the Commission, while
recognizing that a refusal to license would only constitute an abuse of a dominant
position in “exceptional circumstances,” stated that it did not consider itself
bound by any exhaustive checklist as to such circumstances in the existing case
law. Microsoft and the Commission are now locked in a debate as to whether,
unlike other cases,11 the decision requires Microsoft to license competition
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and John Ratliff
7 The information in question related to file, print and group and user administration services for
Windows work group networks.
8 Microsoft, supra note 1, at para. 472.
9 Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. I-5951 [hereinafter Tetra Pak II].
10 Microsoft, supra note 1, at para. 1064.
11 See, e.g., Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223
and Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 [here-
inafter Magill]. In Magill, television listings owners were obliged to provide listings information to a
competitor which wanted to offer a new, comprehensive television listings guide.
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against its own IP rights, and in the same market as Microsoft, or whether the
impact is only on other secondary markets.12
About a month after the Microsoft decision was taken, the ECJ gave its judg-
ment in IMS Health, immediately sparking controversy both for itself and
because of potential parallels to the Microsoft case.13
IMS Health is a German company that provides pharmaceutical companies
with data on wholesaler sales to pharmacies. Over the years, in collaboration
with the pharmaceutical industry, IMS developed a “brick” structure according
to which German postal districts were broken into 1,860 areas, each with a com-
parable number of pharmacies. The brick structure appeared to be protected by
copyright under German law.
The case came to the ECJ on a reference from a German court,14 with questions
as to whether the refusal to give access to that structure was abusive. The ECJ
gave an interesting but complex answer, where it restated that a refusal to grant a
license is not normally an abuse of a dominant position, but may be so in “excep-
tional circumstances.” After considering the Magill and Oscar Bronner judgments,
the former an IP case and the latter a factual “essential facility” case, the ECJ con-
cluded that for a refusal to license by a dominant firm to constitute an abuse con-
trary to Article 82, it was “sufficient” that three cumulative conditions be fulfilled: 
(i) The undertaking requesting grant of the license must be intending to
offer new products or services, for which there is a potential consumer
demand and which are not offered by the dominant firm; 
(ii) the refusal to license must not be justified by objective considerations;
and 
(iii) the refusal must eliminate all competition on the secondary market,
by reserving it to the dominant company.
As regards the first condition, the ECJ stated that the company that seeks to
be licensed must “not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or
services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the copyright,
Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82
12 See Sven B. Völcker, The implications of Microsoft and IMS Health: Interesting times for dominant
intellectual property holders in Europe, COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, Jun. 2004, at 14, 16-17.
13 IMS Health, supra note 5.
14 The IMS saga is a long-running one. In response to a complaint, the Commission had originally adopt-
ed an interim decision obliging IMS to license its “brick” system. Commission Decision 2002/165/EC,
NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim measures, 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18. This interim decision was subsequently
suspended by both the President of the CFI and on appeal of the ECJ (Case T-184/01, IMS Health v.
Commission, 2001 E.C.R. II-3193 and Case C-481/01 P(R), NDC Health v. IMS Health and Commission,
2002 E.C.R. I-3401 respectively) before being withdrawn by the Commission. Commission Decision
2003/741/EC, NDC Health/IMS Health, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 69.
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but intend to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right
and for which there is potential consumer demand.”15 This is an interesting posi-
tion, which offers a fair amount of respect for IP rights. However, there is likely
to be dispute as to what constitutes a new product, the meaning of “essentially
duplicating,”16 and proof of the “intention” to offer a new product.17
The third condition, which was briefly discussed above in relation to Microsoft,
relates to the obligation to license to a competitor. IMS argued that it was nec-
essary to identify two separate markets, one in which the dominant undertaking
was active and another in which the potential licensee was seeking entry. In
response, the Commission argued that it was only necessary to identify two “dif-
ferent stages of production” that are interconnected. In practice, the ECJ chose
to combine the two approaches, in the sense that it required two markets, but
stated that the upstream market could easily be found. Notably, such a market
could be “hypothetical” or “potential,” provided that it involved an upstream
input that was indispensable for the downstream product. Therefore, the input
need not have been sold separately. 
The key point for present purposes is that this is a complex and controversial
area of law, which Commissioner Monti’s successor will certainly have to con-
tend with because of the Microsoft appeal. It will be interesting to see if the EC
court agrees with the Commission that Microsoft’s position is covered by “excep-
tional circumstances” justifying an obligation to license.
B. TYING
The second abuse found by the Commission in Microsoft was the unlawful
bundling by Microsoft of its Media Player with Windows. The Commission con-
cluded that PC operating systems and media players are separate products and,
given that Windows is so widespread on computers, Microsoft’s decision to bun-
dle Media Player guaranteed that this product also became ubiquitous to an
extent that could not be matched. The Commission feared that this would make
Media Player the industry standard, as content providers and software developers
would support Media Player and drop support for competing products, resulting in
usage being driven towards Media Player with competitors’ products being mar-
ginalized. The tying was therefore tipping the market towards Microsoft’s product.
The Commission also believed that Microsoft would acquire control over related
markets such as content encoding software, media delivery software, and digital
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and John Ratliff
15 IMS Health, supra note 5, at para. 49 and see Ivo Van Bael and Jean-François Bellis, ECJ clarifies the
conditions required for the grant of a compulsory licence of copyright under Art. 82, EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW NEWSLETTER, Jun. 2004, at 1.
16 Pat Treacy, Long-awaited judgment forces companies to licence IP rights, THE EUROPEAN LAWYER, Jun.
2004, at 12.
17 Völcker, supra note 12, at 18.
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rights management technology. It seems that the Commission was influenced in
this respect by Microsoft’s past encounters with antitrust authorities and the pos-
sibility of it having a wider tactic to dominate software markets viewed as strate-
gically important. The Commission also considered that Microsoft’s dominance
could lead to technical development being stunted to the detriment of consumers.
Finally, the Commission did not think that the tying of Media Player and
Windows could be justified by any efficiency benefits. In
reaching its conclusion, the Commission carried out a
detailed, careful review of the foreclosing effects of
Microsoft’s practice on the market.
The Commission decided that while Microsoft could
continue bundling Media Player with Windows, it was
obliged to make an unbundled version available at the
same time. PC manufacturers could therefore choose
which media player they wished to install on their PCs. The decision also pro-
hibits Microsoft from any conduct that would make the unbundled version less
attractive and have the same effect as tying (i.e. offering Windows at a discount-
ed rate when purchased with Media Player). Interestingly, the Commission states
that if its remedy proves to be ineffective, it “reserves the right to review the
present decision and impose an alternative remedy.”18
As mentioned above, the Microsoft decision is on appeal and, given the high
profile of the company involved, the amount of the fine imposed, and the future
implications for Microsoft’s ability to bundle its new products with updated ver-
sions of Windows,19 the decision is bound to be controversial—all the more so
since bundling is a frequent practice in the quickly evolving high-tech industries.
To an extent, however, it must be said that this was an unusual case. The
Commission noted that “Microsoft’s dominance presents extraordinary features”
and was concerned about the effect of tying on markets characterized by network
effects.20 Dolmans and Graf, in a recent article, summarize this concern well:
“Markets characterized by network effects may be particularly vulnerable to
tying. In such markets, the number of customers who acquire the product
Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82
18 Microsoft, supra note 1, at para. 1012.
19 See Völcker, supra note 12, at 15 (emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the Commission’s decision
which is not “necessarily dispositive for the outcome of any future investigation”).
20 See, e.g., Microsoft, supra note 1, at para. 975. (“The media player market is, in fact, a strategic gate-
way to a range of related markets, on some of which high revenues can be earned.”) On the
economies of networks see William Bishop, A Note on the Economics of the Microsoft Decision,
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, May 2004, at 14.
IN R E A C H I N G I T S C O N C L U S I O N,
T H E CO M M I S S I O N C A R R I E D O U T
A D E TA I L E D,  C A R E F U L R E V I E W
O F T H E F O R E C L O S I N G
E F F E C T S O F MI C R O S O F T’S
P R A C T I C E O N T H E M A R K E T.
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influences future demand for that product. The wider the product’s distribu-
tion, the more demand will there be for that product. In such cases, a tie will
have an impact beyond the tied customer share because the increased distri-
bution share resulting from the tie will also impact on future demand for the
tied product.”21
It is also arguable that a U.S. court would have followed the same approach in
deciding the case. The Commission used a “rule of reason” style analysis, which
included consideration of any possible efficiencies. Winckler, Dolmans, and Graf
claim that the approach is consistent with the “analytical framework” set out by
the U.S. Court of Appeals which remanded the case for further consideration
under a rule of reason to the district court.22 Völcker also considers that the
Commission’s approach is not significantly different from the approach of the
U.S. agencies and courts to Microsoft.
The CFI will now have to decide on the validity of the Commission’s decision
and the legacy for Commissioner Monti’s successor will be to defend it. It should
be an important case for tying also but, as noted, it is not clear how broad a
precedent will emerge, since the context is rather special and specific.
III. Pricing
A. REBATES: CLASSIC ISSUES23
Commissioner Monti’s successor will also have to deal with pricing and, in par-
ticular, rebates. As explained above, the European Commission rules here are
controversial since the cases state that it is generally unlawful for a dominant
firm to use loyalty and target rebates, even though other competitors may com-
pete using such practices.24 The key cases in recent years are British Airways v.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and John Ratliff
21 M. Dolmans & T. Graf, Analysis of Tying Under Article 82 EC: The European Commission’s Microsoft
Decision in Perspective, WORLD COMPETITION 225, 234 (Jun. 2004).
22 A. Winckler, M. Dolmans, & T. Graf, The European Commission’s Microsoft Decision, GLOBAL COMPETITION
REVIEW 30, 31(May 2004).
23 See generally John Ratliff, Abuse of a Dominant Position and Pricing Practices: A Practitioner’s
Viewpoint, available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2003/200306COMP-Ratliff-
sII.pdf.
24 A loyalty or fidelity rebate is a discount that is paid when a customer commits to purchase all or most
of its requirements from a particular supplier; a target rebate is a discount that is paid if the customer
meets a defined target, especially where it is set by reference to a previous performance or taking
account of likely future requirements.
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Commission (BA/Virgin)25 and Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II) 26—both deci-
sions have already been upheld on appeal by the CFI.
In BA/Virgin,27 the Commission and the CFI found that British Airways (BA)
was infringing Article 82 by offering individualized growth incentives to UK-
based travel agents, the rebates concerned being based on the agents’ past sales
for BA during previous reference periods.28 The Commission imposed a fine of
EUR 6.8 million and the decision was upheld in its entirety by the CFI.
The rebates were calculated on the travel agents’ total sales, not just on their
incremental sales above the target. The Commission observed that this meant
that “selling relatively few extra BA tickets can have a large effect on [the trav-
el agents’] commission income.”29 The Commission condemned the rebate
scheme as having an exclusionary effect: travel agents, keen to obtain as large a
rebate as possible, would be conscious of the need to increase the number of BA
tickets they sold, compared to the previous reference period, and would therefore
be less likely to sell other airlines’ tickets. The scheme thus worked like a fideli-
ty rebate in that it tended to exclude other airlines from which travel agents
would be less likely to purchase tickets. The system was therefore “fidelity-build-
ing” which, for a dominant company, is considered likely to have serious exclu-
sionary effects on the already weak residual competition in the market. The CFI
agreed with the Commission and stressed the progressive nature of the rebates
which had a “very noticeable effect at the margin, the increased commission
rates were capable of rising exponentially from one reference period to anoth-
er.”30 The CFI also noted that BA’s main competitors in the United Kingdom
could not have afforded to offer as attractive a discount scheme.
The Commission had also based its decision on the discrimination between
travel agents resulting from the scheme. The rebate was calculated in accordance
with a comparison with an agent’s previous performance in selling BA tickets.
The scheme was therefore considered discriminatory because agents who sold
different numbers of BA tickets could receive the same rebate and agents who
Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82
25 Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Commission (Dec. 17, 2003, not yet reported) [hereinafter
BA/Virgin], appeal to the ECJ is pending.
26 Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission (Sep. 30, 2003, not
yet reported) [hereinafter Michelin II].
27 Note that the BA/Virgin decision was adopted on Jul. 14, 1999 under then-EC Competition
Commissioner Van Miert.
28 Commission Decision 2000/74/EC, Virgin/British Airways, 2000 O.J. (L 30) 1.
29 BA/Virgin, supra note 25, at para. 29.
30 Id. at para. 272.
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sold the same number of tickets could receive different payments. This placed
certain agents at a competitive disadvantage and infringed Article 82(c). The
CFI agreed with this analysis.
In Michelin II, the Commission had investigated the practices of this leading
European tire manufacturer, which sold new and retreaded tires for heavy vehi-
cles in France.31 Among other issues, the case concerned rebates based on
achieving certain sales and individualized target rebates, based on achieving the
same amount of Michelin sales as in previous years. 
The Commission objected to several aspects of Michelin’s rebate scheme: the
relatively long reference period (one year) over which the rebate was calculated;
the payment of the rebate on total sales rather than on incremental sales; the late
payment of the rebate (it was not paid until the next purchasing cycle); and the
scheme’s lack of certainty. 
The Commission also took into account factors that were specific to the case
and the particular industry, namely, that the dealers were only making low mar-
gins and indeed were initially forced to sell at a loss; the effect of which was that
dealers only established a profit margin once the rebates were paid. As in
BA/Virgin, the Commission considered that what might look like an objective
quantity rebate was in fact loyalty-inducing and had the “inherent effect, at the
end of [the reference] period, of increasing pressure on the buyer to reach the
purchase figure needed.”32 As a result, Michelin’s system was considered likely to
have serious market foreclosing effects. The CFI agreed with the Commission’s
analysis and upheld the fine of EUR 19.76 million.
In both BA/Virgin and Michelin II, the CFI stated that there is no legal require-
ment to show that the rebates in question actually produced anticompetitive
effects. As noted above, the rebates were condemned as having the likely effect
of being loyalty-inducing. The CFI summed up the relevant law in BA/Virgin in
the following terms: 
“[F]or the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 82, it is not
necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on
the markets concerned. It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the
abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and John Ratliff
31 Commission Decision 2002/405/EC, Michelin, 2002 O.J. (L 143) 1.
32 Michelin II, supra note 26, at para. 228.
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competition, or in other words, that the conduct is capable of having, or like-
ly to have such an effect”33 (emphasis added).
The idea is that such likelihood is inferred for dominant companies because of
their market strength.
This approach has been criticized. Some argue that the Commission and the
EC courts should adopt a more effects-based economic test for when rebates
granted by a dominant firm are in breach of Article 82.34 These critics argue that
a very different approach applies in the United States, where proof of anticom-
petitive harm resulting from allegedly exclusionary behavior is required. One
may also argue that such a “presumptive effect” approach contrasts with other
cases in which the Commission and CFI have been at great pains to assess
alleged foreclosure effects on the relevant market. For example, in the Van den
Bergh Foods case,35 which concerned infringements of Articles 81 and 82 by a
dominant ice cream manufacturer in Ireland, the Commission carried out a very
detailed investigation before concluding that the practice in question (the sup-
ply of a free freezer cabinet to retailers on condition that they used the cabinet
exclusively for selling ice cream made by the dominant company) led to the fore-
closure of some 40 percent of the relevant market.36 Arguably, this is also true in
comparison to Microsoft, where the Commission appears to have undertaken an
extensive analysis of the foreclosure effects of tying Media Player to Windows.37
Against this, one should bear in mind that the CFI appears to hold determined
views in this area. Two different sets of judges in two different chambers of the
court were involved in these rulings, and they repeatedly emphasized that they
were applying what the English would call “settled” law. In other words, the CFI
considers that this is established law, to be accepted and simply followed.
In Michelin II, the CFI suggested that a dominant firm could advance an objec-
tive efficiency justification for its rebates by showing economies of scale due to
increased sales to the particular customer. However, Michelin had not adduced
sufficiently detailed information in this respect. In BA/Virgin, the position was
Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82
33 BA/Virgin, supra note 25, at para. 293.
34 John Kallaugher and Brian Sher, Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse
Under Article 82, E.C.L.R. 2004, 25(5), 263-285.
35 Commission Decision 98/531/EC, Van den Bergh Foods, 1998 O.J. (L 246) 1.
36 Note that this analysis was largely carried out in the examination of Van den Bergh’s conduct under
Article 81.
37 Völcker, supra note 12, at 15.
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similar. The CFI noted that if an increase in quantity results in a lower cost for
the supplier, the supplier is “entitled to give the customer the benefit of that
reduction by means of a more favorable tariff. . . Quantity rebates are thus
deemed to reflect gains in efficiency and economies of scale achieved by the
dominant undertaking.”38 However, again the CFI con-
sidered that BA had not discharged the burden of prov-
ing efficiency considerations linked to its rebates. In par-
ticular, as noted above, the CFI objected to the rebate
being calculated on total rather than incremental sales
(i.e. “the additional remuneration of the agents thus
appears to bear no objective relation to the consideration
arising for BA from the sales of the additional air tick-
ets”).39 Such comments recognizing the place of efficien-
cies are welcome. One way forward now, both for domi-
nant companies and the Commission, if it adopts guide-
lines on the application of Article 82, would be to try and
make this clearer. One would hope, for example, that
dominant companies would not be held to an impossible standard of minute
proof of costs and efficiencies. Dominant companies, like their non-dominant
competitors, need practical rules.
The most recent development on rebates is the Commission’s negotiations
with Coca-Cola. The text of the proposed commitments by Coca-Cola has been
published on the Internet and interested parties can submit comments before
they become legally binding on Coca-Cola.40 Coca-Cola has offered the commit-
ments under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003,41 a new procedure that enables the
Commission to accept binding commitments to bring a possible antitrust viola-
tion to an end. At first sight, the Commission’s position does not appear dramat-
ically new, although one may note that it appears that the Commission may be
finding tying within a product family, which would be a development of its prac-
tice. The Commission also appears to be allowing Coca-Cola some exclusivity in
some contexts, such as sponsorship, which is a useful clarification for dominant
companies.
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Hence, the law on rebates remains essentially unchanged under Commissioner
Monti. It is an area in which dominant companies claim that they are being pre-
vented from competing, as they see it, “normally” with their smaller rivals, with
the same type of rebate schemes as these smaller companies use. Some critics
argue that the CFI’s argument that BA’s competitors could not have matched the
level of rebates being offered by BA also risks the CFI being accused of protect-
ing competitors rather than competition.42 However, if this means that rebates
are unlawful if they have the object or effect of denying competitors the critical
mass required to compete, the two may be the same. Clearly, there is already
much debate as to whether these rules should change in any Commission guide-
lines on Article 82—an interesting legacy for Commissioner Monti’s successor.
B. APPLICATION OF MARGIN SQUEEZE PRINCIPLE
Another topical area in Article 82 is margin squeezing (i.e. where an upstream
supplier leaves his downstream competitor too little margin to make a profit).
This has long been considered an abuse of a dominant position.43
In May 2003, the Commission adopted a decision fining Deutsche Telekom
(DT) EUR 12.6 million for what it considered an abusive margin squeeze for
wholesale access to the final (or local) telecommunications loop between the last
switch and household.44 The Commission found that DT was dominant in the
markets for wholesale and retail access to the local loop. The Commission con-
sidered that DT had been “margin-squeezing” and claimed that there was an
insufficient spread between DT’s (wholesale) local loop access prices and DT’s
downstream tariffs for retail subscriptions. As a result, third-party competitors
could not compete for end customers. 
In calculating the margin squeeze the Commission compared the single whole-
sale service (local loop access) to several retail services (access to analogue, ISDN,
and ADSL connections). In itself, this is a complex task, leaving scope for differ-
ing interpretations. The Commission then applied a “weighted approach” to prices
and costs, aggregating retail access for analogue, ISDN, and ADSL connections on
the basis of the number of each variant that DT had marketed to its own end-users.
The Commission then compared the wholesale and retail prices: where the
average retail prices were below the level of the wholesale charges, there was a
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margin squeeze; where DT’s average retail costs were above its wholesale charges,
the Commission looked at DT’s product-specific costs for providing its own retail
services, and considered that there was a margin squeeze if those costs exceeded
the “positive spread” between the retail and wholesale prices. DT argued, among
other things, that this was too narrow an approach and that revenues for call
services (which are included in overall pricing decisions as incremental rev-
enues) should also have been taken into account.
DT also objected that it had little scope for autonomous conduct where its
wholesale prices were regulated (apparently at what the German regulatory
authority considered to be cost level). DT’s retail prices were also regulated,
albeit in a different way. However, the Commission argued that DT could still
have increased its retail charges to increase the spread between wholesale and
retail prices. DT has since appealed to the CFI.
These are complex issues, illustrating how difficult it is generally to implement
Article 82. The decision is also controversial because the Commission appears to
have overruled the national regulator.
C. PREDATORY PRICING
In July 2003, the Commission also fined Wanadoo Interactive, a subsidiary of
France Telecom, some EUR 10.35 million for predatory pricing in ADSL-based
Internet access services to the general public.45 The Commission considered that
between 1999 and 2002, Wanadoo had marketed its ADSL services at prices
below their average costs (before August 2001 below variable costs; afterwards
equivalent to variable costs, but below total costs) while France Telecom was
expecting significant profits for its wholesale ADSL provision to Internet service
providers (including Wanadoo). In effect, the Commission argued that this was
a deliberate policy to preempt competition on the market for high-speed Internet
access, when it was first introduced. The abuse was found to have ended in
October 2002 when France Telecom reduced its wholesale ADSL prices by some
30 percent. Wanadoo has since appealed to the CFI. 
It is understood that the decision contains a discussion of the possibility of
recouping initial losses. EC law has not required the Commission to prove that
an entity that engages in predation must be able to recoup its losses.46 In
Wanadoo’s case, it is understood that the Commission maintains this position
but nonetheless demonstrates that, given the market structure (significant barri-
ers to entry), recoupment should have been possible. If so, this will be an inter-
esting development.
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IV. Liberalization
Article 82 has often been a key weapon in the Commission’s armory when it has
attempted to liberalize markets that were formerly state-controlled, in tandem
with Article 86 of the EC Treaty.47 Commissioner Van Miert’s term as EC
Competition Commissioner was particularly noted for this. Commissioner Monti
has continued the approach of using Article 82 to liberalize markets.
A. CASES INVOLVING DEUTSCHE POST
In one of two decisions taken against Deutsche Post, the former German postal
monopoly, the Commission found that the company, by offering unlawful fideli-
ty rebates and by setting predatory prices in the part of the market for parcel
delivery that was open to competition, was abusing its dominant position.48
These practices prevented new entrants from reaching the critical mass required
to operate in the relevant market. Deutsche Post was found to be cross-subsidiz-
ing its activity in the competitive market from revenue received in the reserved
postal market that was not open to competition. The Commission calculated
costs in the parcel delivery market by asking what costs would be avoidable if the
parcel delivery service were discontinued. The Commission obliged Deutsche
Post to introduce accounting separation and a transparent transfer pricing mech-
anism for services provided on the competitive market. Deutsche Post also
agreed to a structural separation of its commercial parcel services from its
reserved services in order to eliminate the risk of future cross-subsidization. As a
result, Deutsche Post no longer offers any commercial parcel services. The
Commission fined Deutsche Post EUR 24 million in respect of the fidelity
rebates but did not impose a fine for the predatory pricing, in consideration of
the fact that the relevant measure of cost that a “multi-service” postal operator
benefiting from a reserved area has to meet in competitive activities had not pre-
viously been clarified.
In the second case, the Commission found that Deutsche Post had abused its
dominant position in the German letter market when it intercepted, surcharged,
and delayed incoming international mail that it had erroneously classified as cir-
cumvented domestic mail (so-called “A-B-A remail”).49 The Commission found
that Deutsche Post had priced differently for the same service, thus treating
international mail in a discriminatory manner, engaged in a “constructive refusal
to supply,” priced excessively, and limited development of the markets. In view
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of legal uncertainty at the time of the infringement, only a symbolic fine of EUR
1,000 was imposed.
The Commission has also found abuses of dominant positions in the postal
markets in Belgium,50 France,51 and Italy.52
B. SETTLEMENTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
There have also been a number of important settlements in cases relating to net-
work industries. For example, the Commission obliged the main Spanish elec-
tricity generator to modify an agreement whereby it would purchase gas from a
Spanish gas company; this action removed a barrier to entry in the market.53 The
Commission also negotiated settlement agreements that helped open up electric-
ity markets, for example, interconnection between the United Kingdom and
France.54 Similarly, the Commission used settlement agreements with five gas
companies that had refused access to their pipelines to Marathon, a Norwegian
gas producer, to open up the gas market to more competition.55
V. Normative Developments: The Application of
Article 81(3) to Dominant Companies
A. MODERNIZATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLES 81 AND 82
No discussion of Commissioner Monti’s term would be complete without men-
tion of his work on the modernization of the application of Articles 81 and 82.
With the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 on May 1, 2004, national courts
and competition authorities can apply not only Article 82 (this was always the
case) but also Article 81 in its entirety, including paragraph three which sets out
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clearance criteria.56 In parallel to this decentralization, the Commission has also
been reviewing and modernizing how it thinks Article 81 should be applied, in
an effort to focus its activity on cases involving market power. 
Three particular points may be noted here as regards Article 82. First, Member
States retain the right to apply stricter national rules on unilateral conduct.57
This was a concession to some Member States such as Germany which feel
strongly that strict rules should continue to apply in this area.
Second, Regulation 1/2003 provides that the Commission may impose struc-
tural remedies for breach of the competition rules.58 However, structural remedies
may only be imposed where they are proportionate and there is no equally effec-
tive behavioral remedy, or any behavioral remedy would be more burdensome on
the entity than the proposed structural remedy. There has been much debate
about whether this could be used to break up a company in an Article 82 case,
which certainly appears to be one possible application of the power. However,
one may think that would be a rare issue. The more frequent and often equally
controversial issue is the compulsory interference with property rights—whether
it is IP as discussed above or other property such as ice cream cabinets. In the EC
courts’ case law, subject to the complexities outlined above, this is, in principle,
clearly already possible. 
Third, the modernization process has included the introduction of market
share ceilings to the general EC block exemptions giving “safe harbors” to cer-
tain restrictive practices. Notably, this has been the case for vertical agreements
and licensing agreements.59 The practical point to note, therefore, is that domi-
nant companies cannot normally rely on such safe harbors, but have to assess
their practices individually in these circumstances. To this extent, the regulato-
ry position of dominant companies has become more demanding but one may
well say understandably so, given their market power.
We have already seen some examples of the Commission’s approach in such a
situation. For instance, the Commission recently reached an agreement with
Interbrew, the Belgian brewer, regarding its “tied house” purchasing system.60
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Broadly, among other things, the Commission has agreed that Interbrew may
impose a “50% of total beer turnover requirement” when concluding “loan agree-
ments” with bars, along with other restrictions in other agreements. The market
shares of Interbrew were 56 percent of the market for pubs, restaurants, and
hotels, suggesting dominance, so this is an interesting decision. The decision also
appears to indicate that the Commission is willing to accept some requirements
provisions for the dominant company, at least where there is a clear justification
for such provision.
B. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81(3) TO DOMINANT COMPANIES
We have also seen interesting new developments concerning Article 81(3) and
dominant companies. Article 81(3) provides a defense to companies whose
agreements are caught by Article 81(1), which prohibits agreements that have as
their object or effect the restriction of competition. One
of the conditions for the application of Article 81(3) is
that the agreement does not substantially eliminate com-
petition on the market.
Interestingly, in its new guidelines on the application
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty61 and its new guidelines on
the application of Article 81 to technology transfer agree-
ments,62 the Commission suggests that Article 81(3) may
be available to dominant companies, provided that there
is no abuse of a dominant position.63 In other words, the
limit of Article 81(3) is not dominance—as was previous-
ly thought by many—but the abuse thereof. This is said to be coherent with the
application of Article 82 insofar as the ECJ has already recognized that exclusive
licenses may not be per se abusive for dominant companies.64
These statements appear to widen the commercial options available to domi-
nant companies and are to be welcomed. They are particularly striking when
compared with statements in the relatively recent Commission guidelines on
vertical restraints65 and horizontal66 agreements, especially as these guidelines
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were considered to be reflective of a more economic approach to the application
of Article 81. For example, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints appear to
exclude the application of Article 81(3) to dominant companies67 and the
Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements state that “Where an undertaking is dom-
inant or becoming dominant as a consequence of a horizontal agreement, an
agreement which produces anticompetitive effects in the meaning of Article 81
can in principle not be exempted [under Article 81(3)].”68 One may think there-
fore that, even before any Article 82 guidelines, the Commission’s position is
already evolving and, usefully, the Commission is sending out signals of a more
modern practice.
VI. Winds of Reform
As noted above, the Commission has indicated that it is conducting a review of
the application of Article 82. In a recent speech, Philip Lowe, the Commission’s
Director-General of Competition, indicated that the Commission might be in a
position to publish draft guidelines early next year, although this may be affect-
ed by the change of Commissioner.69
It is generally recognized that the notion of “abuse” is in need of review. For
example, in a recent article, Sher laments the lack of “internal consistency”
within Article 82 and its lack of coherence with other competition provisions of
the Treaty of Rome.70
In our opinion, any reform must fulfill two objectives.71 First, the guidelines
must spell out the policy objective (or objectives) pursued by Article 82. This is
essential for a successful decentralized application of Article 82. In the past,
Article 82 has been used as a tool for market integration and liberalization.
Unlike in the United States, there are many national champions in Europe that
have not earned their dominant positions through greater efficiencies but
through state intervention. This makes Article 82 somewhat different to equiv-
alent provisions governing the behavior of dominant entities in other jurisdic-
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tions. However, the primary objective of Article 82 must remain the protection
of competition and, in this respect, it is very important that the Commission set
out what constitutes harm to competition.
Second, the guidelines must indicate the ways and means (i.e. the rules
through which the objective of Article 82 is to be attained). These rules must
certainly reflect greater economic thinking. However, it is also clear that the
business community, practitioners, regulators, and courts want these rules to be
practical. 
This is a difficult task for the Commission and one of the first major challenges
for its new EC Competition Commissioner. Ultimately, however, as during
Commissioner Monti’s tenure, the CFI and the ECJ will have the last word on
the concept of abuse in EC law. The greater economic approach to Article 81 has
been favored by the jurisprudence of the EC courts. Given the CFI judgments in
BA/Virgin and Michelin II, it is not evident that the same is true with respect to
at least some Article 82 rules. Nonetheless, provided the Commission leads the
way and produces clear, sensible, and workable guidelines, we believe that the
EC judges may also be receptive to a modernization of Article 82.
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